US-Israel-Ukraine axis deploys replica Shahed drones to drag Iran’s neighbors into war

By Yousef Ramazani

Since the launch of the American-Israeli military aggression against Iran on February 28, 2026, a parallel shadow war has emerged across the Persian Gulf, one fought not with conventional arsenal but with cloned weapons designed to deceive.

As Iranian armed forces continue to conduct retaliatory strikes under Operation True Promise 4 against American and Israeli assets, a sophisticated network involving the United States, the Israeli regime, and now Ukraine has deployed hundreds of replica Shahed-136 attack drones against the infrastructure of Persian Gulf states.

These attacks, confirmed by multiple Iranian military sources and documented through recovered wreckage, represent a calculated strategy to fracture regional unity and draw Iran's neighbors into direct confrontation with the Islamic Republic.

With the aggression now in its 29th day, evidence points to an unprecedented false-flag campaign that weaponizes the very technology Iran pioneered, turning the Shahed drone's reputation against its creators in a cynical bid to remake the region's geopolitical landscape.

Strategic logic of deception

The central objective of the US-Israeli false-flag campaign is as simple as it is destructive: convince the Arab states of the Persian Gulf that Iran is attacking their sovereign territory, thereby provoking military retaliation that would transform the current US-Israeli aggression against Iran into a full-scale regional war.

Iranian military authorities have documented this strategy with increasing specificity this past month since the aggression began, noting that the enemy, having failed to achieve its stated objectives through direct military confrontation, has resorted to what Colonel Ebrahim Zolfaghari, spokesman for the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters, described as "trickery and deception."

The operational concept leverages a critical vulnerability in modern battlefield forensics.

From a distance—whether observed by eyewitnesses on the ground or captured by civilian cameras—the cloned drones are visually and audibly indistinguishable from Iran's original Shahed-136 loitering munitions.

They share the distinctive delta-wing configuration, the characteristic pusher propeller engine sound, and the same low-altitude flight profile that has become familiar across conflict zones from Ukraine to the Persian Gulf.

This superficial identity creates immediate assumptions of Iranian responsibility, precisely as the architects of the deception intend. Yet Iranian military intelligence has identified a crucial distinction: these drones are not Iranian.

They are produced under the designation "Lucas" (Low-Cost Uncrewed Combat Attack System) by American defense contractors, with Spektre Works having unveiled this Shahed replica at a Pentagon event as early as summer 2025.

The Lucas drone was explicitly designed to emulate the Iranian model at a comparable cost point of approximately $35,000—a fraction of traditional American munitions but sufficient to create plausible deniability when debris fields are examined by non-specialists.

Iranian military sources expose the conspiracy

Throughout March 2026, Iranian military officials have provided increasingly detailed revelations about the false-flag campaign, presenting evidence that US and Israeli forces are operating cloned drones against targets across the region.

On March 15, the Khatam al-Anbiya Central Headquarters issued a formal statement warning all neighboring countries that "the enemy, which has been defeated on the battlefield and in forming political coalitions against Iran, has turned to deceit and has replicated the Iranian Shahed-136 drone, launching attacks on unjust targets in regional countries under the new name 'Lucas' drone."

The statement specifically identified attacks in Turkey, Kuwait, and Iraq in the preceding days as examples of this malicious plot, emphasizing that these strikes had been falsely attributed to Iranian armed forces.

Colonel Zolfaghari's warning carried an explicit caution to regional governments: the enemy's purpose is to "cultivate distrust and direct accusations at the Islamic Republic of Iran and ultimately to create division between Iran and its neighboring countries, thereby undermining the legal and legitimate defensive actions of the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran."

A military source speaking to Iranian media on March 15 provided additional operational details, confirming that an attack on the Lanaz refinery in Erbil, in Iraq's Kurdistan Region, was not conducted by Iran or resistance groups.

"Our information indicates that this attack was carried out by Americans or Israelis under a 'false flag,' and its goal is to unnecessarily widen the aggression against targets that are not part of Iran's and the resistance's target data bank," the source stated.

The same source noted that an attack on Kuwait International Airport's radar system—initially reported by Western media as an Iranian operation—was also the work of US and Israeli forces.

Iran's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Alireza Enayati, has amplified these warnings through diplomatic channels and public statements.

On March 15, he posted on social media, sharing the military's assertion that the "enemy" was using drones "disguised as a Shahed under the name Lucas drone."

Enayati has consistently emphasized Iran's defensive doctrine: the Islamic Republic only targets the interests and assets of the United States and the Zionist entity, and any operation Iran conducts is officially announced with Tehran accepting full responsibility.

The absence of such announcements, he argues, is conclusive proof of non-involvement.

Disputed attacks across the Persian Gulf

The pattern of attacks falsely attributed to Iran began escalating in early March 2026, coinciding with the onset of the US-Israeli aggression against Iranian territory on February 28.

Saudi Arabia reported multiple drone incursions, including the interdiction of thirteen drones over Riyadh and the Eastern Province, with the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) issuing a categorical denial of any connection to these strikes.

Ambassador Enayati also denied Iranian involvement in attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure, including the Ras Tanura refinery and the Shaybah oil field.

On March 11, drone strikes targeted fuel storage tanks at the port of Salalah in Oman.

The Iranian Embassy in South Africa responded through social media, refuting claims of Iranian responsibility and explicitly labeling the attack a "false flag operation."

The rapidity of these Iranian denials—often issued within hours of the attacks themselves—reflects Tehran's awareness of the enemy's strategy and its determination to prevent the deception from succeeding.

Kuwait has also been targeted, with the attack on Kuwait International Airport's radar system representing a particularly dangerous escalation.

Civilian aviation infrastructure is not and has never been a legitimate target for Iranian military operations, which focus exclusively on American and Israeli assets.

The false attribution of such strikes serves the enemy's dual purpose: inflaming regional sentiment against Iran while simultaneously creating the impression that Tehran is violating international norms of conflict.

Iraq, already bearing the weight of repeated US-Israeli violations of its sovereignty, has seen attacks on facilities, including the Lanaz refinery in Erbil.

Iranian military sources have emphasized that such targets are not part of Iran's operational planning, noting that Tehran maintains detailed target data banks focused exclusively on American and Israeli positions.

The false-flag attacks on Iraqi infrastructure are designed to pressure Baghdad into distancing itself from Iran, further isolating the Islamic Republic in a region where external powers have long sought to divide and conquer.

Ukraine's entry into regional war

Perhaps the most alarming development in the evolving regional situation is Ukraine's active participation in the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran.

Beginning in mid-March 2026, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy announced the deployment of 201 military anti-drone experts to Persian Gulf states, with additional personnel en route.

The first teams arrived in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, with Jordan receiving additional deployments.

These Ukrainian specialists are not neutral advisors—they are combatants in the US-Israeli aggression against Iran, deployed specifically to counter Iranian drone technology.

President Zelenskyy's framing of this intervention has been characteristically direct.

Addressing the UK Parliament on March 17, he declared: "The regimes in Russia and Iran are brothers in hatred, and that is why they are brothers in weapons. And we want regimes built on hatred to never win—in anything."

This rhetoric, which conflates Iran's defensive military cooperation with Russia with the American and Israeli aggression against Iranian sovereignty, serves to legitimize Ukraine's entry into a conflict thousands of kilometers from its own borders.

Iranian officials initially dismissed Ukraine's involvement as insignificant. On March 13, Iran's envoy to Ukraine, Shahriar Amouzegar, described the assistance as "nothing more than a joke and a showy gesture."

However, on March 14, Ebrahim Azizi, head of Iran's parliamentary committee on national security and foreign policy, declared on social media that Ukraine had "effectively become involved in the aggression" by providing drone support to the Israeli regime and regional states.

Invoking Article 51 of the UN Charter, Azizi stated that Ukraine's entire territory had "turned into a legitimate target for Iran"—a warning that Kyiv would be wise to heed before further entangling itself in a regional conflict far from its ongoing confrontation with Russia.

The strategic irony of Ukraine's position is profound. While Ukrainian personnel are deployed to the Persian Gulf to counter drones they claim are Iranian, their own country has become a primary source of the very technology enabling the false-flag campaign.

Ukrainian defense manufacturers have spent years reverse-engineering captured Shahed-136 airframes, and by early 2026, the Ukrainian industry had developed the capability to produce Shahed-compatible drones using authentic Iranian components harvested from battlefields.

The "Batyar" drone, Ukraine's domestically produced Shahed copy, shares the same delta-wing configuration, engine type, and flight characteristics as the original Iranian system.

On March 27, 2026, Ukraine and Saudi Arabia formalized their defense cooperation with a signed pact during President Zelenskyy's two-day visit to Riyadh.

The agreement "lays the foundation for future contracts, technological cooperation, and investment," with Zelenskyy stating that Ukraine is "ready to share our expertise and systems with Saudi Arabia."

This defense relationship, established in the midst of the US-Israeli aggression against Iran, positions Ukraine as a direct participant in regional security arrangements designed to counter Iranian influence—while Ukrainian-made drone technology remains available for false-flag operations through channels that Tehran has repeatedly identified.

Technology of deception

Iranian military sources have provided detailed technical assessments of how the enemy produces and deploys cloned Shahed-136 drones for false-flag operations.

The process, according to these sources, leverages the very success of Iran's indigenous drone program against the Islamic Republic, using the Shahed's reputation as a battle-proven weapon to create confusion about the origin of attacks across the Persian Gulf region.

The technological foundation for this deception was established through years of Western reverse-engineering efforts.

Following the Shahed-136's combat debut in Ukraine, American defense contractors recognized the drone's effectiveness and began developing replicas for training purposes.

Griffon Aerospace produced the MQM-172 Arrowhead, a near one-to-one replica initially marketed as a target drone to train air defenses against the Shahed threat.

Spektre Works developed the Lucas drone with a cost target of approximately $35,000, explicitly designed to emulate the Iranian model.

These systems, originally intended for training, have been repurposed for offensive operations in the Persian Gulf theater.

The operational concept relies on what Iranian military sources describe as "forensic ambiguity."

From a distance, the cloned Lucas drone is visually indistinguishable from the original Shahed-136. Its delta-wing configuration, approximate dimensions, and pusher propeller engine create the same radar signature and visual profile.

To eyewitnesses on the ground, to civilian videographers capturing footage from urban areas, and to military personnel tracking unidentified aerial contacts, the drone appears Iranian.

Only through close forensic examination of recovered components—examining serial numbers, manufacturing marks, and electronic signatures—can the true origin be determined.

The auditory deception is equally important. The Shahed-136's distinctive engine sound—produced by its MD550 rotary internal combustion engine—has become a recognizable signature across conflict zones.

The Lucas drone, using an equivalent engine, generates an acoustically identical profile.

For civilians hearing drones overflying their cities, the sound alone creates the immediate impression of an Iranian attack, precisely as the false-flag operation intends.

Iranian military sources have documented the specific methods by which the enemy ensures its cloned drones pass superficial forensic inspection.

Harvested components from captured Shahed-136 airframes—including engines, flight control modules, and navigation systems with authentic Iranian manufacturing marks—are incorporated into new airframes.

This component re-use means that even if debris is recovered, the presence of Iranian-manufactured parts appears to confirm Iranian origin.

Only comprehensive forensic analysis, examining serial number ranges, component wear patterns, and firmware signatures, can reveal the deception. The scale of available Iranian components in enemy hands is substantial.

Ukrainian forces have recovered over 300 partially or fully intact Shahed-136 airframes since 2022, along with at least 150 Shahed-131 variants.

This inventory provides thousands of individual Iranian-manufactured components—engines, flight computers, GPS receivers, actuators—that can be harvested and installed in new airframes.

The Russian production of Geran-2 drones at the Alabuga facility in Tatarstan, which uses Iranian-sourced core components, has further expanded the pool of available Iranian parts.

The sophisticated nature of this deception explains why Iranian military authorities have repeatedly emphasized to regional governments that visual identification alone is insufficient to establish responsibility for drone attacks.

When a delta-wing drone with a pusher propeller is sighted over a city in the Persian Gulf, it may be an original Iranian Shahed-136 launched as part of legitimate retaliation against American or Israeli targets.

It may be an American Lucas drone or another copy of the Shahed-136 launched from a covert base in the region as part of the false-flag campaign.

It may be a Ukrainian Batyar drone launched from positions coordinated with US intelligence. The visual and acoustic signatures, Iranian military sources emphasize, are identical.

Iranian military sources have also warned that the false-flag campaign may expand beyond drone attacks.

The same cloned technology, they note, could be used in missile attacks, with American and Israeli forces potentially launching Iranian-style rockets against Persian Gulf infrastructure.

The objective remains constant: to create the appearance of Iranian aggression where none exists, thereby drawing Iran's neighbors into direct conflict with the Islamic Republic.

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