Iran poised to unleash strategic military surprises if Israel ignites fire again

By Mohammad Molaei

Experience has shown that the Zionist regime has never adhered to ceasefire agreements, not in Gaza and not in Lebanon. So, naturally, Iran remains fully prepared if the regime again resorts to foolhardy military adventurism after unilaterally declaring a truce.

The arrival of military cargo aircraft from the United States and other allies to the occupied territories in recent days is a clear indication that something is fishy. Although detailed information about Israel’s military contracts following the 12-day war of aggression against Iran is unavailable due to confidentiality, credible reports provide some details of these preparations.

According to reports, the United States has sent more missile defense systems worth hundreds of millions of dollars to strengthen Israel’s air defense, which was weakened in the recent war.

Furthermore, according to the US Department of the Treasury, the country has approved the sale of $510 million worth of ammunition to Israel. This package includes 3,840 guidance kits for 2,000-pound bunker-buster bombs (BLU-109) and 3,280 satellite-guidance kits for 500-pound bombs (MK82).

The contract includes logistical, technical, and engineering support, with Boeing as the primary contractor. The rapid transfer of part of this equipment from US military stockpiles to Israel indicates the urgent need for the Israeli Air Force to reinforce its military capabilities.

Additionally, reports indicate an increase in joint Israeli-American military exercises and deployment of advanced radar systems in the occupied territories, all suggesting readiness for another potential confrontation with the Islamic Republic.

Reports of increased simulated air strike exercises against distant targets, deployment of AN/TPY-2 radars linked to the THAAD system, and reinforcement of Israeli military bases in the occupied territories further confirm this trend. These measures were undertaken not only to rebuild Israel’s military capabilities after the 12-day war but also to indicate planning for offensive operations.

On June 13, 2025, the Israeli regime launched an unprovoked and unlawful military aggression on Iran, targeting its military and nuclear installations and assassinating many senior military commanders, nuclear scientists, as well as ordinary civilians.

In the initial hours, Israel’s war minister Israel Katz declared a state of emergency across the occupied territories, indicating Israel’s readiness for a rapid Iranian military response.

Hours after the Israeli aggression, Iran responded by launching suicide drones toward the occupied territories. These drones were designed to engage the Israeli defense systems, especially the Iron Dome, to create an opportunity for partial reconstruction of Iran’s air defenses.

It was followed by the first wave of missile attacks. These attacks, part of the “True Promise 3” operation, involved ballistic and hypersonic missiles from various Iranian bases in cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, Kermanshah, Shiraz, and Tabriz.

During 12 days of the imposed war, Iran launched over 500 ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles in 22 operational waves. These included missiles such as “Emad” with pinpoint accuracy, “Kheibar Shekan” with high maneuverability, “Haj Qasem” with medium range, and for the first time, “Sejjil” with a range of 2,000 kilometers and hypersonic speed. These strikes had profound and multifaceted impacts on Israel’s military-industrial infrastructure.

Impact of Iranian retaliation

These retaliatory attacks targeted the Bazan oil refinery in Haifa Bay, which produced 200,000 barrels of oil per day and supplied over 60 percent of Israel’s fuel consumption, including gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel. They also caused extensive fires in storage tanks, destruction of pipelines, and a complete halt in refinery operations. Bazan Company announced that returning to normal operations by October 2025 is impossible due to the need for major repairs and infrastructure reconstruction.

The crisis forced the Zionist regime to import up to 110,000 barrels of fuel daily. Considering global oil prices, this daily import imposed an approximately $8 million financial burden on Israel’s economy. At the same time, global concerns about a potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz—the main route for 20% of the world’s oil—led to a 12% increase in global oil prices, impacting energy markets in Europe and Asia.

The Haifa power plant, with a capacity of 1,020 megawatts and supplying about 7 to 8 percent of Israel’s electricity, was targeted by Iranian ballistic missiles, resulting in the destruction of internal stations and widespread outages in northern regions. The Leviathan gas platform, which provides 40% of Israel’s electricity through natural gas, also suffered severe damage to extraction and transmission infrastructure, causing a 30% reduction in output. This vulnerability led to intermittent power outages in Haifa, Tel Aviv, and surrounding areas.

In response, Israel turned to renewable energy development and increased the share of solar power in its energy mix from 10% to 40%. However, disruptions in the global supply chain and difficulties importing solar equipment due to sanctions and regional tensions delayed new projects by up to two years, imposing an annual cost of approximately $300 million on the regime’s economy. This trend also eroded foreign investor confidence in Israel’s energy market.

In terms of human and material losses, Iranian retaliatory attacks claimed several lives, though due to sweeping censorship, the actual death toll is not known. Hebrew media such as Haaretz and Yedioth Ahronoth reported massive damage to approximately 32,000 structures in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Bat Yam, and Petah Tikva – most of them military-industrial sites embedded in residential areas.

While Hebrew sources claimed that only 34 out of about 500 missiles launched by Iran penetrated Israeli defense systems, this figure is inconsistent with the reported extent of damage. Accepting Israel’s claims would imply that each missile, on average, damaged 941 homes, which is logically improbable given the destructive capacity, geographical dispersion, and population density of targeted areas. This contradiction sparked widespread criticism in Israeli media and military circles.

Failure of Israeli air defenses

From a psychological and political perspective, the inability of Israel’s advanced defense systems to intercept Iranian hypersonic missiles such as “Kheibar Shekan” and “Sejjil,” with high accuracy and speeds exceeding Mach 5, undermined the regime’s military prestige. Reports of failures in the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 3 systems against Iran’s simultaneous multi-layered attacks triggered a wave of domestic criticism against Netanyahu’s war cabinet.

The psychological pressure from these attacks led to the temporary migration of approximately 50,000 people from northern areas to central and southern occupied territories, increasing public anxiety and reducing trust in military and political institutions.

Iranian attacks on Haifa port—the largest commercial port in the occupied territories—also disrupted supply chains for essential goods such as food and medical equipment, increasing import prices by 15%, which imposed additional pressure on households.

Ultimately, Iran, by executing 22 waves of missile and drone attacks, using satellite intelligence, intelligence networks, and precise coordination among combat units, succeeded in imposing unprecedented military, economic, and psychological costs on the Zionist regime.

The unilateral ceasefire declared by the United States on behalf of the regime on June 24, 2025 reflected Israel’s inability to continue the aggression beyond 12 days. This development strengthened Iran’s deterrence power in the region and had broad geopolitical consequences, including reinforcing the axis of resistance and increasing global attention to Iran’s military capabilities.

Experience has shown that in the event of a ceasefire violation by the Zionist regime and renewed attacks on Iranian soil, the armed forces of the Islamic Republic, especially the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), possess multiple options—leveraging advanced military capabilities and modern strategies—to inflict heavy damage on Israel’s infrastructure and interests, potentially altering the regional balance of power significantly.

Analysis of images released from boosters of missiles launched towards the occupied territories, which fell in target areas after warhead release, indicates that during the first three days of the 12-day war (June 13 to July 25, 2025), the IRGC employed advanced solid-fuel missiles.

However, in the following days, it deliberately used liquid-fuel missiles with older technology. This intelligent and strategic choice reflects the preservation of modern missiles for more critical phases of the war. Notably, no reports have emerged of the destruction of solid-fuel missile launchers, suggesting that Iran has reserved these weapons for intensified stages, particularly if Israel attacks key infrastructure such as oil facilities in Khuzestan or power plants.

Past Iranian strikes on the Bazan refinery demonstrated the vulnerability of Israel’s traditional energy infrastructure. Therefore, if the war resumes, Iran will likely target alternative Israeli infrastructure such as solar farms in the Negev Desert and central regions.

These facilities, due to their dispersion, dependency on imported equipment, and lack of effective defense systems, represent vulnerable targets. Their destruction could cause wider blackouts and impose additional psychological and economic pressure on Israeli settler society.

Comparison of operations “True Promise 1 and 2” with “True Promise 3” reveals significant advancements in Iran’s missile accuracy. Use of hypersonic missiles such as “Sejjil” and “Kheibar Shekan,” with pinpoint accuracy and speeds exceeding Mach 5, has rendered Israel’s advanced defense systems—Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow 3—ineffective against simultaneous multi-layered attacks.

Upcoming surprises for the enemy

This progress enables Iran, in case of escalation, to deploy the preserved solid-fuel missiles to deliver devastating shocks to Israel’s critical infrastructure, particularly remaining refineries, Haifa’s ammonia tanks, and offshore gas platforms like Leviathan and Tamar.

Beyond missiles, Iran can deploy advanced drones such as “Shahed-149” and “Arash-2,” boasting ranges over 2,000 kilometers and capable of carrying heavy warheads. These drones fly at low altitudes and on unconventional paths to evade Israeli radar systems, enabling targeting of command centers, Nevatim and Ramon airbases, and even the Dimona nuclear facility.

Moreover, according to regional sources, Iran is likely to employ cyber capabilities concurrently with physical attacks. Cyberattacks on electricity grids, communications, and banking systems could multiply the effectiveness of missile strikes and extensively disrupt Israel’s infrastructure. Previously, cyberattacks attributed to Iran caused malfunctions in Israeli banking and digital systems.

Within this framework, Iran may engage the Axis of Resistance, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon, to launch missile and rocket attacks from the northern front. This would force the Zionist regime to divide its defensive resources across multiple fronts, significantly reducing the overall effectiveness of its defense systems.

Hezbollah, with an arsenal exceeding 150,000 rockets and missiles, is capable of targeting Haifa, Acre, and other northern cities, while Iran targets Tel Aviv and occupied Al-Quds from its own territory.

This multifaceted strategy—a combination of solid-fuel missiles, offensive drones, cyberattacks, and proxy operations—entangles the Zionist regime in a war of attrition. Simultaneous disruption of energy, economic, and military infrastructures will further undermine public trust in Netanyahu’s cabinet.

Furthermore, if Israeli attacks continue, Iran may employ its space capabilities, such as the Noor-2 and Noor-3 satellites, to gather real-time, precise intelligence on Israeli military movements. This capability allows Iran to deliver rapid, accurate responses based on real data to the regime’s maneuvers.

In the event of ceasefire violations by the Zionist regime and renewed attacks on Iranian territory, China—as a key strategic partner of the Islamic Republic—can play a vital role in bolstering Iran’s deterrence capabilities by supplying advanced weaponry.

These include long-range air defense systems, microwave anti-drone technologies, electronic warfare systems, and advanced drones and missiles.

China, which purchases a large portion of Iran’s exported oil and has made key investments in projects like the North-South Corridor, has expanded its military cooperation with Iran in recent years. In the event of an all-out war, the likelihood of China providing strategic arms to Iran is high.

One of the most important weapons China could provide is the HQ-9 air defense system; comparable to the Russian S-300, it has a range of 200 kilometers and can simultaneously engage up to 12 targets—including fighter jets, cruise missiles, and short-range ballistic missiles—significantly enhancing Iran’s defense against Israeli air attacks. Its HT-233 radar can detect targets up to 300 kilometers away and neutralize multilayered threats promptly.

Additionally, microwave anti-quadcopter systems such as the LD-2000, designed by China, use high-power waves to disrupt or destroy light reconnaissance drones like Hermes 450 and Heron TP within a 5-kilometer radius. These systems can increase the security of Iran’s missile bases in mountainous regions and curb Israeli reconnaissance and attack threats.

China can also supply advanced electronic warfare systems such as the Type 928D. By jamming enemy radars like Israel’s AN/TPY-2 and satellite-guided precision bomb systems like JDAM, these systems can significantly reduce the accuracy of Israeli strikes on Iranian infrastructure, providing Iran with the necessary window for an effective response.

Among other armaments China might supply are advanced drones such as the CH-5 Rainbow. With a 6,500-kilometer range, the ability to carry one ton of munitions, and 60-hour flight endurance, these drones would be highly effective for reconnaissance and offensive operations against sensitive targets within the occupied territories, including airbases, energy infrastructure, and command centers. Equipped with laser guidance and artificial intelligence systems, these drones can execute precision strikes that saturate and overwhelm Israeli defense systems.

The combination of these weapons with advanced missiles and cyber operations will present the Zionist regime with a multifaceted, attritional challenge. The HQ-9 system increases Iran’s active defense capabilities, creating space for focused counterattacks. Anti-drone systems ensure base security, while electronic warfare equipment disrupts enemy navigation systems, facilitating accurate Iranian retaliatory strikes.

Strait of Hormuz – a key card

Alongside all these capabilities, the Islamic Republic of Iran holds a critical geopolitical lever: the Strait of Hormuz. This strategic waterway, through which approximately 20 million barrels of oil—about 20% of global traded oil—pass daily, represents a powerful card Iran can play. In case of escalating tensions, it could become a significant pressure point to shock global energy markets.

According to reports, after the initial Israeli attacks on June 13, 2025, Iran loaded naval mines onto its vessels in the Persian Gulf and prepared for mining the Strait of Hormuz. Although this measure has not yet been operationalized, it signals Tehran’s determination to employ geopolitical tools in response to potential acts of aggression in the future.

The Strait of Hormuz, with a narrowest width of only 33 kilometers, plays a critical role in the transportation of crude oil and liquefied natural gas from OPEC member countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Iraq. Any disruption along this route—such as mine-laying or seizure of oil tankers—could drive oil prices from around $74 to between $120 and $150 per barrel, and in worst-case scenarios, even up to $400. Banks such as JPMorgan and Citibank have warned that such a spike in oil prices could raise global inflation rates by up to 2%, and in the United States, inflation could surge as high as 18%.

This energy crisis would challenge the economies of countries dependent on energy imports, including the United States, China, India, Japan, and Europe. In Europe, gasoline prices could rise beyond €2.5 per liter, causing major German and Italian industries to experience blackouts and production declines. In the U.S., increased energy and transportation costs could depress stock markets by up to 8% and sharply boost consumer inflation.

Iran, possessing over 5,000 naval mines—especially modern magnetic and pressure-sensitive types—and with the capability to rapidly deploy them via fast boats and Ghadir- and Fateh-class submarines, can turn the Strait of Hormuz into a critical chokepoint for the global economy.

This measure, combined with missile attacks on Israel’s energy infrastructure, could exert additional economic pressure on the United States and weaken Washington’s diplomatic ability to provide unconditional support to Israel.

A full bag of surprises

Overall, Iran’s potential surprises in the event of a ceasefire violation are not limited to deploying more precise and faster weapons; rather, they reflect a comprehensive and multidimensional strategy that combines military, intelligence, cyber, proxy, and geopolitical tools to place unprecedented pressure on the Zionist regime and shift the regional balance in Iran’s favor.

Among other potential surprises in case of ceasefire violation by the Zionist regime is the use of special operations and field missions inside enemy territory. Some intelligence sources report the readiness of the IRGC Quds Force to carry out sabotage operations against critical Israeli facilities, including power transmission lines, ammunition depots, and cyber infrastructure.

These operations could coincide with missile and drone attacks to increase pressure on the Zionist regime and cause widespread disruption in Israel’s military command and control. Especially given unconfirmed reports of infiltration around Haifa and Tel Aviv, it is likely that in the case of renewed war, these capabilities will be used as surprising and unpredictable weapons.

Alongside these direct actions, Iran could benefit from unexpected support by groups and networks in the region that have not yet played a direct role in this war. For example, some security analysts believe that if the Zionist regime attacks Iran again, groups in Jordan, the occupied West Bank, or even in southern Syria and the Sinai Desert might, spontaneously or with Iranian intelligence backing, target Israeli logistical routes or military bases.

This would open new heterogeneous fronts against Israel and double the regime’s need to disperse its forces. These informal supports, together with Iran’s direct and indirect capabilities, could provide a more complete picture of a “multi-layered siege” strategy against the Zionist regime— a strategy that uses not only firepower but also regional infiltration and mobilization.

To sum it up, if the Zionist regime violates the ceasefire and renews attacks against Iranian soil, it will face not only a widespread missile and drone response but also a set of strategic surprises ranging from special operations deep within the occupied territories to cyberattacks, utilization of space capabilities, activation of Axis of Resistance capacities, and even leveraging geopolitical tools such as the Strait of Hormuz.

The combination of these elements, with potential military support from powers like China and mobilization of hidden regional networks, could create a complex and multidimensional equation of Iran’s active deterrence against Israeli aggression — an equation that not only changes the regional balance of power in Tehran’s favor but also sends a clear message to all regional and extra-regional actors: Iran is not only fully prepared to defend itself but also capable of making the cost of any aggression unbearable for its enemies.

Mohammad Molaei is a Tehran-based military affairs analyst.

(The views expressed in this article are author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of Press TV)

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